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AN ANTITRUST REMEDY FOR INTERNATIONAL PRICE
PREDATION: LESSONS FROM ZENITH V. MATSUSHITA
Harry Firstt
Abstract: The purpose of this article is to articulate a set of rules for an antitrust
cause of action against international predatory pricing. The article develops these rules
in the context of the antitrust and trade litigation brought in the United States and Japan
against the Japanese televisions manufacturers between 1956 and 1986. The thesis of
this article is that the litigation illustrates that antitrust enforcement should concentrate on
exclusion from the home market rather than on low prices in the target market. The arti-
cle also argues that antitrust should encompass a concern with the strategic use of market
power to protect rents, to capture spillover benefits in complementary industries, or to
capture the current oligopoly profits of the targets of predation. The proposed cause of
action requires proof of exclusion from the blocked home market and pricing below cost
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"But Japanese sets were better and cheaper," I said.
"They may have been better," Ron said, "but they were only
cheaper because they were sold below production cost, to wipe out
American competitors. That's called dumping .... "
"Then why didn't we stop it?"
"Good question .... They also fixed prices: they had something
called the Tenth-Day Group. Japanese managers met every ten days in a
hotel room to set prices in America.... And of course all during this time,
American companies could never fight back in Japan. They couldn't even
get a foot in the door in Japan."
"You're saying the Japanese took over the television industry
illegally?"
Ron shrugged. "They couldn't have done it without our help," he
said .... [T]he Japanese dumped steel, television, consumer electronics,
computer chips, machine tools - and nobody stopped them.... Industry
after industry, year after year. While we sit around and spout off about
free trade." 1
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of international price predation, although an old one, has
been of particular concern in the twentieth century. It has been dealt with
mostly as a matter of trade policy, combining, in current practice, applica-
tion of antidumping legislation and government negotiation.
Domestic predatory pricing has also been of economic concern, par-
ticularly predatory pricing done through geographic price discrimination.
In the United States, it has been dealt with by antitrust law. In the early
twentieth century, the ability to engage in such pricing was identified as a
source of power for monopolists such as Standard Oil, and it led Congress
in 1914 to enact the Clayton Act's provisions forbidding price discrimina-
tion and the Federal Trade Commission Act's provisions forbidding unfair
methods of competition. More recently, predatory pricing has been the
1 MICHAEL CRICHTON, RISING SUN 201-03 (1992).
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subject of private litigation brought under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act.
Although the trade policy approach is still vigorously applied in the
international area, its results are seen by many as economically inefficient,
protecting high-cost producers from more efficient foreign competitors. 2
Might antitrust law offer a possible alternative to trade policy? The idea
that antitrust could be a useful approach to this problem is hardly a new one;
Viner's classic study on dumping discusses it.3 Nevertheless, antitrust has
rarely been used to attack international predatory pricing.
This article will explore the possibilities of using an antitrust ap-
proach to international predation. To illustrate some of the problems with
such an approach, the article will use as an exemplar a case of alleged inter-
national predatory pricing in which both the trade and antitrust approaches
were tried -- the Japanese television manufacturers' cartel. Many view this
case as a paradigmatic example of predation by foreign competitors. At the
very least, the case shows the problems of the two legal approaches, but it
also provides some suggestions for modifications to current antitrust ap-
proaches in this area.
The first part of this article reviews the case against the Japanese
television manufacturers and how it was pursued under trade law and anti-
trust law. The second part of the article concentrates on the antitrust
theories for predatory pricing. The basic thesis of this article is that antitrust
law should concentrate on exclusion from the home market, rather than on
low prices inthe target market. Ending this exclusion not only offers the
possibility of discouraging strategic predation, but directly fosters open
markets, a primary goal of antitrust. A secondary point is that U.S. antitrust
need not be concerned only with injury to U.S. consumers through the
extraction of monopoly profits in the goods subject to predation (indeed,
historically antitrust has not been so limited). Rather, antitrust should be
concerned with the strategic use of market power to protect rents, to achieve
strategic goals in complementary industries, or to capture the current profits
of the targets of predation, when those targets operate in oligopolistic
international markets where -the capture of profits by domestic industries is
important for national economic welfare.
2 See generally COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT TO CONGRESS (1994)
(criticizing dumping).
3 See JACOB VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 239-40 (1966 ed.) (1923).
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II. THE LITIGATION
A. The Chronology
Television, although invented in the United States before World War
II, did not become commercially viable until after the War. In Japan, the
seven major companies that would make up Japan's television industry
(Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Hitachi, Sony, Toshiba, Sanyo, and Sharp) were all
in existence by 1947. In 1949, Matsushita began to organize its distribution
system into exclusive territories and near-exclusive retail outlets.4 In 1953,
RCA licensed its technology for black-and-white televisions to Japanese
firms.5
Formal collusion in Japan began shortly thereafter. In 1956, a group
of sixteen major appliance manufacturers (including the television manu-
facturers) and an association of appliance dealers formed the Household
Electrical Appliance Market Stabilization Council. The purpose of this
group was to control wholesale and retail prices of home electric appliances
and to prevent shipment of products to discounters. An attempt to restrict
output was also necessary to the effort. One year after its. formation, in
1957, Japan's Fair Trade Commission (although at a low ebb in its en-
forcement efforts) issued a Recommendation Decision ordering the Council
to end its price-fixing agreement as well as the agreement to boycott
discounters. The Recommendation was accepted by the parties.6
Whether the industry completely abandoned its efforts to prevent
price-cutting cannot be stated with certainty. Nevertheless, it appears that
4 Kozo Yamamura & Jan Vandenberg, Japan's Rapid-Growth Policy on Trial: The Television
Case, in LAW AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY: AMERICAN AND JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES
238, 252-53 (Gary R. Saxonhouse & Kozo Yamamura eds., 1986) [hereinafter Yamamura & Vandenberg].
Matsushita's initiative to gain control over its distribution system so as to prevent price cutting is described
in M. YOSHINO, THE JAPANESE MARKETING SYSTEM: ADOPTIONS AND INNOVATIONS 111-16 (1971).
5 James Millstein, Decline in an Expanding Industry: Japanese Competition in Color Television, in
AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 106, 124 (John Zysman & Laura Tyson eds., 1983)
[hereinafter Millstein].
6 For a description of the Council's efforts and the FTC's decision see, e.g., DAVID SCHWARTZMAN,
THE JAPANESE TELEVISION CARTEL: A STUDY BASED ON MATSUSHITA V. ZENITH 77-80 (1993)
[hereinafter SCHWARTZMAN]; Kenji Kawagoe, Ryutsu keiretsuka no fittai [The Actual Situation of the
Process of Creating Distribution Keiretsu] (1977), translated in JOHN HALEY & MITSUO MATSUSHITA,
JAPANESE ANTITRUST LAW: COMMENTARY AND CASES 288,289-91 (1987) (mimeo).
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the industry spent several years without any formally organized effort to
control price or output.
It was during this time that exports of television sets began. As of
1960, just slightly more than one percent of Japan's black-and-white televi-
sion production was being exported (and only about a quarter of that to the
United States).7 As of 1963, exports to the United States had risen only to
2.6 percent of the U.S. market.8 Despite this low level of exports, in 1963
the major television manufacturers entered into an export cartel agreement.
Pursuant to this agreement the manufacturers set minimum export prices for
sales of black-and-white television sets in the United States (referred to as
"check prices"). The publicly stated rationale of the agreement was both to
expand exports and to prevent "disturbance" to the U.S. market which might
lead to the filing of dumping complaints. 9 The agreement was entered into
pursuant to the Export and Import Trading Act of 1952, and it was approved
by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MITI") pursuant to
that Act, thereby conferring a statutory antitrust exemption on the agree-
ment with regard to prosecution under the Antimonopoly Law. 10
In 1964, the Japanese manufacturers formally organized an elaborate
hierarchy of groups to discuss the price and output of television sets for the
domestic market. Issues went from mid-level managers (the Tenth Day
Group), to the senior managing directors of the companies (the Palace
Group), to the presidents of the companies (the Okura Group). Discussions
included minimum prices, margins for wholesalers and retailers, and the
level of rebates. Color televisions were added to the discussions in 1965.
The more senior groups were not limited to televisions, but discussed other
products in the home appliance field as well.11
7 See SCHIWARTZMAN, supra note 6, at 113 tbl. 6.6.
8 Yamamura & Vandenberg, supra note 4, at 261 tbl. 4.
9 See id. at 261. In light of the fact that the check prices were lower than domestic prices, it is
unclear how the agreement would successfully have prevented a dumping complaint. See id.
10 See Yushutsunyii torihiki h6 (Export-lmport Transaction Law) § 33, Law No. 299 of 1952. MITI
subsequently stated that it "directed" the manufacturers to enter into the agreement (presumably not under
the 1952 Act, which does not give any such authority to MITI) and that it "supervised the preparation" of
the agreement "so that MITI's intention was correctly reflected." Statement of the Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry transmitted by letter from Embassy of Japan to United States Department of State
(Apr. 25, 1975) in Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Defendant-Appellant, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (No. 83-2004), microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records and
Briefs app. at 7a-12a (Microform, Inc.) [hereinafter MITI Statement].
11 See SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 6, at 8 1-89; Yamamura & Vandenberg, supra note 4, at 255-56.
The Tenth Day Group was so named because its first meeting was on the tenth of the month; the other two
Groups were named for the Tokyo hotels where they met.
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Two years after the formation of these groups in 1966, Japan's Fair
Trade Commission ("JFTC") began a new investigation of the industry.
The JFTC issued a recommendation charging six of the major television
manufacturers with a violation of section 3 of the Antimonopoly Law (a
horizontal restraint of trade) arising out of their activities in the domestic
market.12 This action was followed by a recommendation in 1967 charging
Matsushita with fixing resale prices and with refusals to deal with discount-
ers. 13
Exports to the United States continued to grow. By 1966, Japanese
firms had 14 percent of the U.S. black-and-white television market
(accounting for 26 percent of Japan's output). 14 The Japanese industry also
began to export color televisions; in 1966, Japanese firms had 4 percent of
the U.S. market (but that accounted for 47 percent of its output of color
televisions that year). 15 In this same year MITI became involved in coordi-
nating and providing financial assistance for a research and development
program to develop solid-state technology for black-and-white and color
televisions. 16
With imports increasing, the television manufacturers in 1967
adopted a second agreement governing their exports to the United States,
the "five-company rule." Under this agreement, each manufacturer was
limited to five customers with whom it could make an export contract or
engage in a "long-term, continuous trading relationship."' 17 One of these
customers would be the manufacturer's own U.S. sales subsidiary, which
made sales to smaller customers that did not come to Japan for buying, and
the other four customers were direct purchasing mass merchandisers or
original equipment manufacturers. 18 A significant aspect of the five-
12 Sanyo Elec. Co., Ltd., Tokyo Shibaura Elec. Co., Ltd. (Toshiba), Hayakawa Elec. Co., Ltd.
(Sharp), Hitachi, Ltd., Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co., Ltd., and Mitsubishi Elec. Corp., Case No. 6, 1966,
discussed in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1209 n.2 (E.D. Pa.
1980).
13 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1177 n.53 (E.D. Pa.
1980). Sony received a warning for similar practices; FTC, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1968 218 (1969); see
also Hideto Ishida, Anticompetitive Practices in the Distribution of Goods and Services in Japan: The
Problem ofDistribution Keiretsu, 9 J. JAPANESE STUDIES 319, 329 (John Haley trans. 1983).
14 Yamamura & Vandenberg, supra note 4, at 262 (tbl. 5); SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 6. at 113 (tbl.
6.6). 15 SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 6, at 110-11 (tbls. 6.4, 6.5).
16 See Millstein, supra note 5, at 107.
17 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
18 See SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 6, at 97.
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company rule was a prohibition on one manufacturer listing the same
customer as another manufacturer.' 9
The five-company rule was adopted as part of the rules of the Japan
Machinery Exporters Association ("JMEA"), whose Television Export
Council was the vehicle for managing the export cartel. Pursuant to the
Export and Import Trading Company Act, the agreement was filed with
MITI.20
Japanese manufacturers' market share in the United States continued
to climb between 1968 and 1970 for both black-and-white and color
televisions.2 1 It also appears that during this period the Japanese manufac-
turers were selling television sets in the United States to mass merchan-
disers and original equipment manufacturers at prices that were below the
check prices.22 This "double invoicing" (the public check prices and the
secret lower prices) led to the filing of the first trade complaint involving
televisions, filed in 1968 by the U.S. Electronic Industries Association.
This complaint alleged that the Japanese manufacturers were violating the
Antidumping Act of 1921 by selling black-and-white and color televisions
in the United States for "less than fair value. 23
Three legal strands converged in 1970. First, the Department of the
Treasury determined that the Japanese manufacturers were selling televi-
sions at less than fair value.24 Second, seventeen days after that finding, the
19 It is unclear for how long this customer allocation rule was part of the written agreement. It was
included in "Guidelines for Registration" attached to the 1973 version of the Rules. See 513 F. Supp. at
1189 n.1 8. The export cartel agreement was not renewed after 1973. Brief for Respondents Zenith Radio
Corp. at 48, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (No. 83-2004)
[hereinafter Brief for Respondents].
20 Act of 1952, § 11. MITI's 1975 statement, provided for purposes of the antitrust litigation, did
not refer specifically to the five-company rule. See MITI Statement, supra note 10. Instead, the letter
refers to directing the parties "with respect to filing of export prices and other related matters." Id
21 See SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 6, at 111 (tbl. 6.5, color), 114 (tbl. 6.7, monochrome).
22 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 19, at 33.48; Yamamura & Vandenberg, supra note 4, at
261-62.
23 See 19 U.S.C. § 160(a). The Electronic Industries Association was formed in the 1960s to lobby
for U.S. manufacturing interests. See The Implications of Our International Trade Policy for American
Business and Consumers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Trade, Investment and Monetary
Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1978)
(statement of Dr. Thomas C. MacAvoy, President, Coming Glass Works), microformed on CIS No. 78-
H241-18 (Congressional Info. Serv.).
24 35 Fed. Reg. 18,549 (1970). At this time the Treasury Department was responsible for
determining if merchandise was being sold in the U.S. for less than fair value, and the Tariff Commission
was responsible for determining if there was a related injury to domestic manufacturers. The duties of the
Treasury Department were transferred to the Department of Commerce in 1979. See 44 Fdd. Reg. 70,703
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National Union Electric Company ("NUE"), a television manufacturer that
had discontinued manufacturing six months before, filed suit seeking
damages under the antitrust laws and the Antidumping Act of 1916. Third,
a hearing decision was finally drafted by Japan's Fair Trade Commission
relating to its 1966 charges against the domestic cartel activities of the six
major Japanese manufacturers. This draft decision found that there had
been a cartel that had agreed to fix minimum prices, resale margins, and
resale prices of black-and-white televisions, in violation of section 3 of the
Antimonopoly Law. The draft decision also found that the violations had
stopped in 1967.25
In 1971, the Tariff Commission decided that the U.S. industry was
being injured as a result of television imports from Japan being sold at less
than fair value.26 The Bureau of Customs consequently added black-and-
white and color Japanese television sets to the list of imports on which
dumping duties should be assessed (although no dumping duties were then
assessed). 27
Three months later, three unions representing workers in the U.S.
television manufacturing industry filed a petition under section 301 of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 alleging that Japanese televisions were being
imported in such quantities as to seriously injure the domestic industry.28
The Tariff Commission rejected the petition for failing to meet the statutory
criterion (trade concessions must be a major cause of industry harm).29
In the same year, Matsushita accepted a consent decision in the do-
mestic vertical distribution case begun by the JFTC in 1967, which Matsu-
shita had contested. In a consent decision under the Antimonopoly Law, the
respondent admits the facts and the legal charge, and sets out a plan for
(1979). The Tariff Commission was renamed the International Trade Commission pursuant to the Trade
Reform Act of 1974. See 40 Fed. Reg. 2,627 (1975).
25 See Yamamura & Vandenberg, supra note 4, at 254; Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1209 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
26 36 Fed. Reg. 4,576 (1971).
27 T.D. 71-76,36 Fed. Reg. 4,597 (1971). Dumping duties are not automatically assessed. They are
levied on an entry-by-entry basis if dumping margins are found to exist. See generally RUTH F. STURM, A
MANUAL OF CUSTOMS LAW 362 (1976).
28 36 Fed. Reg. 11,491 (1971). The purpose of section 301 of the Trade Expansion Act is to provide
the criteria for determining whether a domestic industry qualifies for tariff or other assistance. See 36 Fed.
Reg. 22,654 (1971). The unions were the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO; the International Brotherhood of Elec.al Workers, AFL-CIO; and the International Union of
Elec.al, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC. Id.
29 36 Fed. Reg. 22,653 (1971). The decision is further described in Millstein, supra note 5, at 123.
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remedying the violation. Matsushita agreed that it had attempted to keep
television sets from discounters, and it agreed to end the practice.30
Exports of televisions from Japan continued rising through the early
1970s. Japan's share of the black-and-white market reached its peak in
1971, both in terms of market share and quantity.31 Color television exports
Were similarly high in 1971, although the peak in volume and market share
for the 1970s was not reached until 1976-1977.32
In 1974, Matsushita acquired Motorola's Quasar television division,
an acquisition not challenged by the U.S. government on antitrust grounds,
although Zenith vigorously protested.33 Three months later Zenith filed a
private antitrust suit against the major Japanese television producers. The
suit alleged violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, along with
claims under the Wilson Tariff Act and the Antidumping Act of 1916 (the
latter two being infrequently used statutes prohibiting importing or preda-
tory dumping done with intent to restrain trade or to monopolize).34 Four
months later Zenith's suit was consolidated with NUE's.
No other U.S. manufacturers joined the antitrust litigation. Some
may have chosen to stay out because of on-going business relations with the
Japanese defendants. (General Electric, for example, owned 10 percent of
Toshiba, and RCA was a substantial licensor of technology to the Japanese
producers.)35 Others subsequently chose the trade law route. In 1976, GTE
Sylvania and Philco Consumer Electronics Corporation filed a complaint
with the International Trade Commission (ITC) alleging unfair methods of
30 See Yamamura & Vandenberg, supra note 4, at 254. Matsushita contended that it agreed to the
consent decision to appease the public which had begun to boycott the company's products in response to
the JFTC's charges. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1182 n.66
(E.D. Pa. 1980).
31 See SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 6, at 114 (tbl. 6.7) (36% for imports from Japan); Yamamura &
Vandenberg, supra note 4, at 260 (tbl. 4) (26.9%).
32 See SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 6, at 111 (tbl. 6.5) (29% in 1976, 22% in 1977); Yamamura &
Vandenberg, supra note 4, at 262 (tbl. 5) (18.9% in 1976, 14% in 1977). Part of the U.S. response to
Japanese competition was to move production offshore. This effort, which began in 1967, resulted in an
import market share in 1972 for U.S. subsidiaries and affiliates of 52 percent of the black-and-white market
(the peak year for total U.S. consumption of black-and-white sets). See Millstein, supra note 5, at 114,
116.
33 See Antitrust Procedural Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 390 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 85 (1979) (statement of John J.
Nevin, Chairman, Zenith Radio Corp.), microformed on CIS No. 78-S521-52 (Congressional Info. Serv.)
(discussing this merger as further evidence of a Japanese raid on the United States industry).34 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 8 (Wilson TariffAct), 72 (Antidumping Act).35 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 19, at 55 (alleging that GE had. considered filing suit, but
did not do so because of its ownership interests).
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competition by Japanese television manufacturers in violation of section
337(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930.36 The acts challenged were the same as
those that formed the basis of the antitrust complaint.37
Nine months later COMPACT (the Committee to Preserve American
Color Television38) filed another trade act petition. This case was filed un-
der the "escape clause" (section 201 of the Trade Reform Act of 1974),
charging that Japanese television sets were being exported to the U.S. in
such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of injury to the do-
mestic industry.39
The ITC resolved both cases relatively quickly. In March of 1977, it
found a violation under section 201, recommending that additional duties of
20 percent be levied on the television sets. 40 In June of 1977, the ITC en-
tered a consent order in the section 337 proceeding, in which the Japanese
manufacturers agreed not to engage in any of the conduct with which they
had been charged.4 1
President Carter rejected the ITC's proposed remedies under section
201. Instead, he announced an Orderly Marketing Agreement (pursuant to
his authority under the 1974 Act) which limited the export of color televi-
sions from Japan into the United States to 1.75 million sets per year for the
following three years.42
Meanwhile, the 1966 JFTC charges against the six television manu-
facturers for their domestic cartel activities still remained unresolved. In
1978, the Fair Trade Commission finally ended its work by dropping the
case. Despite the findings of the previously drafted hearing decision, the
JFTC decided that it was unable to resolve the "'factual and legal problems
36 41 Fed. Reg. 14,014 (1976). Section 1337 of Title 19 of the U.S. Code authorizes the ITC to
investigate importing practices for unfair methods of competition which destroy or substantially injure a
U.S. industry. If a violation is found, the statute authorizes the ITC to exclude such imports, issue cease
and desist orders, and levy civil penalties for continued violations.
37 See 41 Fed. Reg. 14,949 (1976).
38 COMPACT was a coalition of unions and domestic manufacturers who still did substantial
manufacturing in the United States. See Millstein, supra note 5, at 128.
39 41 Fed. Reg. 50,076 (1976). This section provides remedies for aggrieved industries without the
section 337's requirements of unfair practices and actual injury. The imports need only be a substantial
cause of a threat of serious injury to trigger protection under Section 201. See generally DAVID SERKO,
IMPORT PRACTICE: CUSTOMS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw 275-79 (1985).
40 42 Fed. Reg. 16,489 (1977). Only three of the six commissioners determined that serious injury
existed for both the black-and-white and color television industries.
41 42 Fed. Reg. 30,262-65 (1977). Inspection and reporting requirements were imposed under the
agreement.
42 Proclamation No. 4511 of the President of the United States, I PUB. PAPERS 1157-61 (1977).
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involved in this case.... [A]ny further prolonging.., is considered to be
undesirable from the point of view of legal stability." 43
In 1980, the U.S. government announced a $77 million settlement of
the dumping duties assessed under the order originally entered in 1971
(pursuant to the antidumping petition filed by the U.S. industry in 1968). 44
Subsequent litigation brought by both Zenith and COMPACT, however,
sought (with some eventual success) to enjoin the collection of the settle-
ment on the grounds that U.S. negotiators had acted improperly in reaching
the settlement.45 It is unclear whether any dumping duties have ever been
collected, either under the agreement or under assessments of dumping du-
ties for subsequent years.
In the same year, the antitrust litigation moved toward a disposition
when the district court issued a series of evidentiary rulings adverse to
Zenith. These rulings held inadmissible: 1) the documents and studies pro-
duced by the Fair Trade Commission in the course of its antitrust proceed-
ings and by the U.S. government in the course of the trade investigations; 2)
the documents seized from the defendants by the Fair Trade Commission in
the course of its investigations; and 3) the reports of Zenith's five experts
relating to the economic theory of its case and to Japan's industrial and
legal system as it affected this industry.46 In 1981, the district court granted
the defendants' motion for summary judgment.4 7 Although subsequently
reversed by the court of appeals,4 8 in 1986 the Supreme Court agreed with
the district court and held that the defendants were entitled to summary
judgment.4 9 This ended the antitrust litigation.
43 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1209 n.2 (E.D. Pa.
198% 45 Fed. Reg. 37,782, n.7 (1980).
45 The substance of Zenith's claim was that the decision to settle was based on "improper
motivations of persons in the Executive Branch . . . [b]ased primarily on political and other irrelevant
considerations." Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 505 F. Supp. 216, 218 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980). See
also COMPACT v. United States, 4 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1155, 1157 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
46 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125 (Public Records
Opinion), 1190 (Japanese Evidentiary Materials Opinion), 1313 (Expert Testimony Opinion) (E.D. Pa.
1980).
47 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
48 In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983).
49 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). Technically, the Court
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for a further search for "unambiguous" evidence of the
conspiracy alleged by the plaintiffs; such evidence was not found on remand, leading the Court of Appeals
to affirm the grant of summary judgment entered by the District Court. See In re Japanese Electronic
Products Antitrust Litigation, 807 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987).
MAR. 1995
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
The antidumping order remains in effect. In 1991, the Department of
Commerce found dumping margins for eleven Japanese manufacturers for
the period 1983-1990, ranging from 0.16 percent to 35.4 percent.0
B. The Antitrust Case
Zenith's antitrust theory was that the Japanese manufacturers had
engaged in "an integrated course of conspiratorial conduct to restrain and
monopolize" the market for television sets in the United States "through
collusive dumping and other anticompetitive activities."51 The cartel coor-
dinated home (Japan) and export (U.S.) pricing so as to create "sharp price
differentials between the two markets." The prices charged in the U.S.
"were generally at a loss," these losses being subsidized by the profits from
price-fixing in the "closed Japanese home market."52
As proof of the existence of the cartel, Zenith pointed to the evidence
of domestic collusion uncovered in the Fair Trade Commission's 1956 and
1966 investigations, and to the formal arrangements surrounding the export
cartel formed in 1963. Evidence of systematic dumping was supplied by the
Treasury Department's dumping findings plus the willingness of the
defendants to sell below-the-check prices. The five-company rule, it was
argued, enabled the Japanese firms to allocate U.S. customers and
"concentrate the effects" of dumping on the U.S. competitors while elimi-
nating competition among the Japanese firms.5 3 The creation of excess
plant capacity in the Japanese market gave the Japanese firms a strong
motive to export rather than to engage in unlimited price competition at
home.54
The Supreme Court did not believe it. The Court approached preda-
tory pricing with the following theory: predatory pricing is pricing at some
loss of profit; these losses are an investment; firms are rational economic
actors that must recoup their investments, plus some return on the amount
invested, at some later point; this would have to be done through monopoly
pricing.
50 See 56 Fed. Reg. 5392 (1991).
51 Brief for Respondents, supra note 19, at 60.
52 Id at 12, 60-61.
53 Id at 81.
54 Id. at 76-77.
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The Court then applied the theory to the case. The Court saw the
cartel idea as problematic, thinking it unlikely that a group of firms would
stick to an agreement to sustain such long-term losses (firms would likely
cheat). Even more unlikely was the opportunity to recoup the losses, given
both the duration of the alleged cartel (two decades already, according to the
Court) and the difficulties of collusively raising prices once the cartel was
successful (particularly with the low entry barriers in this industry). Neither
the check price agreement and its violation nor the five-company rule
helped Zenith. They either restrained competition among the Japanese
firms (thereby helping the U.S. firms) or showed competitive behavior. The
cross-subsidization argument was not persuasive either. Even if the
Japanese manufacturers were earning supra-competitive profits in the do-
mestic market, that did not give them any motive to sustain losses in the
export market, unless those losses could be recouped (which they could not
be).
In the end, the allegation that the Japanese firms engaged in a preda-
tory cartel made "no practical sense" to the Court: "[I]t calls for [the
Japanese firms] to destroy companies larger and better established than
themselves, a goal that remains far distant more than two decades after the
conspiracy's birth."55
Critical to the Court's view of the case was the identity of the plain-
tiffs. Zenith and NUE were competitors seeking damages for injury to their
business caused by price-cutting rivals. The Court was plainly worried that
this was just a complaint about aggressive competition. Liability, the Court
felt, might "chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to
protect."56
The Court thus accepted economic theories that would defeat Zenith's
arguments, even though the theories might actually have supported antitrust
liability had the case been brought by the Government. Taking the Court's
responses to some of Zenith's arguments at face value, the Court's
prediction of the competitive effects of the Japanese firms' behavior should
have led to a government antitrust suit against two clearly admitted agree-
ments, the five-company rule and the check price agreement. The five-
company rule, as a market sharing rule that restricted competition among
the Japanese firms and kept prices up, would have been a per se antitrust
55 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597 (1986).
56 Id. at 594.
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violation.57 The export cartel agreement on check prices, being an effort to
raise or stabilize prices, would also have been a per se violation, subject to
the availability of the foreign government compulsion defense. 58
It is hard to imagine, of course, that the U.S. Government would have
brought suit against the Japanese industry for agreements to raise the prices
of televisions in the U.S. market. In the context of what was happening in
the U.S. industry between 1965 and 1977, such an allegation would have
"made no economic sense." At least at first glance, the idea that the
Japanese firms were engaged in a price-raising effort appears to be as im-
plausible a description of the Japanese firms' behavior as the Court thought
Zenith's description was.
The Government's failure to file an antitrust suit did not, however,
stem from a divergence between economic theory and fact. It is traceable
more to an antitrust skepticism about the U.S. industry's arguments. This
skepticism came out clearly in a letter submitted to the International Trade
Commission by the Justice Department in 1976 in the course of the ITC's
section 337 proceeding:
The acknowledged inventiveness and technical expertise of
[the Japanese manufacturers] ... has made the television indus-
try very competitive and brought substantial benefits to the
American consumer. We become concerned when
businessmen complain that competition is so tough in an indus-
try that "you can't make a decent profit."59
Thus, the Government's inaction stemmed from the belief that the Japanese
television industry's success was the result of a competitive advantage
rather than unfair competition, and that the U.S. industry was motivated by
the fear of falling profits due to increased competition.
This view of the dispute between the U.S. and Japanese producers ul-
timately informed the views of antitrust enforcers in three Administrations,
57 See Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, 498 U.S. 46(1991) (division of customers by formerly competing
bar review companies); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (division of territories
by potentially competing grocery chains).
58 The question whether of MITI's involvement in the export cartel provided an antitrust defense to
Zenith's charges was argued in the Supreme Court, but the Court did not need to reach it.
59 Letter from Jonathan C. Rose, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division, to Will E. Leonard, Chairman, U.S. International Trade Commission (Sept. 24, 1976),
microformedon CIS No. 76-H781-27.1, 93-105 (Congressional Info. Serv.).
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views which moved from disengagement to active support of the Japanese
manufacturers. Zenith's suit was filed during the Ford Administration, but
the Justice Department did not become involved in part because of limited
enforcement resources and its view that the case was being pursued by
competent private counsel. 60 The Antitrust Division in the Carter Adminis-
tration, under prodding by the Senate Judiciary Committee, took a "fresh
look" into the case. Working under limits placed by the Japanese manufac-
turers on the Government's ability to gain access to the documents pro-
duced during discovery, the Antitrust Division investigated for six months
and concluded that there was "no evidence of concerted predatory conduct
intended to destroy or supplant the U.S. color television industry either at an
earlier period or at the present time."61 The Reagan Administration filed an
amicus brief in the Supreme Court supporting the Japanese manufacturers. 62
C. Economic Effects
The Supreme Court's skepticism about Zenith's theory was bolstered
by the market shares in the record as of 1977 when pre-trial discovery was
closed. Although the market share of all the Japanese defendants was close
to 50 percent, Zenith and RCA were actually the market leaders with a
combined share of approximately 40 percent. 63 Market shares for 1974 (the
60 Letter from Donald I. Baker, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division, to Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Feb. 16, 1977), in Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Defendant-
Appellant, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (No. 83-2004),
microfarmed on U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs app. at 15a-I 8a (Microform, Inc.).
61 Department of Justice Budget Authorization (Antitrust Division), Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 360 (1978) (statement of John H. Shenefield, Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division), microformed on CIS No. 78-S521-45.3 (Congressional Info. Serv.).
Shenefield testified that the review and decision were carried out without interference from other branches
of the Administration. Id. at 362. It has been alleged that President Carter, in return for Japan's agreement
to the Orderly Marketing Agreement in 1977, made a side letter agreement which the Japanese interpreted
as terminating any antitrust investigations by the Justice Department into predatory pricing. See
SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 6, at 127; Antitrust Procedural Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 390 Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 87
(1979) (statement of John J. Nevin, Chairman, Zenith Radio Corp.), microformed on CIS No. 78-S521-52
(Conr essional Info. Serv.). If there were such an agreement, the Japanese did not get much.
62 One of the reasons for supporting the Japanese manufacturers was a concern that a rejection of the
sovereign compulsion defense might adversely affect the Reagan Administration's Voluntary Restraint
Agreements in other industries, particularly automobiles. See Brief For the United States as Amicus
Curiae, on Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986) (No. 83-2004).
63 Matsushita, 475 U.S at 591; In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238,
316 (3d Cir. 1983).
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year Zenith filed its suit) through 1978 show Zenith as the top firm, with 21
to 24 percent of the market. RCA was second (overtaking Zenith in 1979)
with shares ranging from 19 to 21 percent of the market.64
These shares have changed somewhat over time, but not toward the
monopoly position that Zenith alleged was the goal of the Japanese manu-
facturers. As of 1986, Zenith had 16 percent of the market and it and RCA
were still the market leaders. By 1990, Zenith's share dropped to 12 percent
(third in the market), but still comfortably ahead of both Sony and
Matsushita (the leading Japanese firms in the U.S.) which had 7 and 5 per-
cent respectively. The levels of concentration in the U.S. market were also
relatively low, with a 1986 (Herfindahl-Herschman Index) HHI of 834 and a
1990 HHI of 941. Both were lower than the HHI in 1982. The four-firm
concentration ratio in 1990 was 52.8 percent. 65
Given the relatively low levels of concentration, one would predict
that prices and profits would tend toward competitive levels. Data for 1986
through 1990 indicate that prices for television sets dropped as against the
consumer price index for all goods (which rose). Retail prices of television
sets declined by about 10 percent over that period while producers' costs
declined by just over 5 percent. Profit margins were reportedly low. 66
Although the industry has not shown a dramatic shift toward greater
concentration, there has been a marked change in the nationality of the
ownership of the firms in the industry. Of the fifteen U.S.-owned firms
manufacturing television sets in the United States in 1971, by 1983 only
five remained under U.S. ownership (one being a very small regional manu-
facturer and one a pr'vate label manufacturer). Five had gone out of busi-
ness, three had been bought by Dutch interests, and two had been acquired
by Japanese firms.67 As of 1990, the two leading firms in the U.S. market
were Thomson, a French firm that acquired RCA and GE (following GE's
64 See International Trade Commission, Economic Effects of Export Restraints, Investigation No.
332-117 Under Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930, ITC Pub. No. 1256 (1982), available in LEXIS,
ITRADE Library, ITC File.
65 International Trade Commission, Industry & Trade Summary, Television Receivers and Video
Monitors, ITC Pub. No. 2445 (ET-1) (1992), available in LEXIS, ITRADE Library, ITC File [hereinafter
1992 ITC Study]. The Herfmdahl-Herschman Index measures the level of market concentration in an
industry. The higher the index, the more concentrated the industry.
See id.
67 See International Trade Commission, Foreign Industrial Targeting and its Effects on U.S.
Industries, Phase I: Japan (Part 2 of 2), Report to the Subcomm. on Trade, House Comm. on Ways and
Means, on Investigation No. 332-162 Under Section 332(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, ITC Pub. No. 1437
(1982), available in LEXIS, ITRADE Library, ITC File [hereinafter 1983 ITC Study].
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acquisition of RCA in 1986), and Philips, a Dutch firm that had acquired
Sylvania and Magnavox. The only major U.S.-controlled producer was
Zenith, which in 1991 sold a 5 percent share of itself to Goldstar, a Korean
television manufacturer. 68
Along with the shift in the nationality of ownership of firms has come
an increase in the number of foreign firms assembling television sets in the
United States, a process set in motion with the 1977 Orderly Marketing
Agreement. By 1983, six Japanese firms, two Taiwanese firms, and one
Korean firm had established TV final assembly operations in the United
States.69 By 1990, almost 90 percent of U.S. production of television sets
was by foreign-controlled companies (including Japanese, Korean, and
Taiwanese).70
Although there are more firms producing television sets in the United
States than ever before, the level of imports has remained at around 50 per-
cent of total consumption. The major country of production for imports into
the United States has shifted from Japan to Mexico, as producers have
shifted production to that country to take advantage of low labor costs, but
substantial numbers of televisions for the U.S. market are also produced in
Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Korea, Thailand, China, and Canada.71
The economic record thus does not confirm Zenith's antitrust fears
that the members of the Japanese cartel would monopolize the U.S. televi-
sion market. The record also supports the argument that foreign production
from other countries would be available to discipline the Japanese cartel had
it achieved monopoly status in the United States (although it is not clear
from these data how much of that production is actually controlled by the
Japanese firms). On the other hand, the economic record lends support to
the trade concern over the shifting of ownership from U.S. firms to foreign
firms. The United States dominated the television industry from its incep-
tion until the early 1970s. It no longer does so.
68 1992 ITC Study, supra note 65.
69 1983 ITC Study, supra note 67.
70 1992 ITC Study, supra note 65.
71 See id tbl. 2 (1986-1990), tbl. 3 (1986-1990).
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III. AN ANTITRUST APPROACH
A. Dealing with the Television Story
How can we understand the activities of the Japanese television
manufacturers between 1963 and 1974? It is undisputdd that they were
selling television sets in the United States at prices significantly below the
prices at which they were being sold in Japan. Should their pricing have
been considered predatory?
1. The Investment/Recoupment Theory
To answer the predatory pricing question requires exploring the in-
vestment/recoupment theory which the Supreme Court used in Matsushita.
This theory served several functions in the decision. First, it enabled the
Court to avoid the difficult question of how low prices must be before they
could be considered predatory.72 Although Zenith had argued that export
prices were below home market prices and that these low prices produced
losses in the United States, Zenith did not indicate what measure of costs it
was using (for example, average total cost, average variable cost, or
marginal cost). Finding no ability to recoup losses anyway, the Court was
able to avoid resolving the debate going on in the courts and in the academ-
ic literature on this issue.
The second legal function served by the theory was its use in deter-
mining whether there was a conspiracy, a prerequisite for section 1 liability.
Given the lack of direct evidence of a predatory pricing conspiracy, the
Court could use the logic of the investment/recoupment scenario to rebut
inferences from otherwise ambiguous evidence (at least ambiguous as to
whether the parties conspired to price predatorily). The investment/re-
coupment theory, however, assumes economic rationality. The Court
avoided the argument that the parties might still have agreed (albeit
"irrationally") by indicating that economically irrational collusive behavior
might be shown with "sufficiently unambiguous" proof.73 The case was
accordingly remanded to give the parties an opportunity to present such
evidence to the lower court (which they were unable to do).
72 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 584 n.8 (1986).
73 See id at 597.
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Subsequent court decisions have shown the investment/recoupment
theory to be more powerful than indicated in Matsushita. In the Supreme
Court's next decision on predatory pricing, it made clear that recoupment is
a prerequisite to a successful claim for predatory pricing. Even where the
plaintiff shows that prices have been below average variable cost, the failure
to prove the likelihood of recoupment will defeat the claim. 74
The theory is powerful for two reasons. First, its economic logic is
unassailable, because it is founded on the understanding that business firms
will not likely continue a money-losing strategy for a significant period of
time. There must be some gain. If there is no likelihood of gain, the parties
either will not embark on the plan or will abandon it soon enough. That
being the case, if we see an extended period of alleged predatory pricing
with no hope for recoupment, it may be that the low prices are not money-
losing low prices, but the kind of competitive pricing that we want to
encourage.
Second, the investment/recoupment scenario focuses inquiry on the
harm from predatory pricing, which is not low prices but recoupment in the
form of monopoly pricing. Competition is supposed to produce low prices.
Antitrust intervention should not occur unless the low prices yield some
harm, beyond the harm to the firm that prefers not to meet the low prices.
The difficulty is not with the logic of the investment/recoupment
theory. It is with its application. As with other antitrust areas where the
Court has resorted to economic analysis, accepting the basic theory only
provides the first level of analysis. Second-level theory, as well as facts, are
then needed to work through to a correct result.75
To understand the conduct of the Japanese television manufacturers
between 1963 and 1977 through the use of the investment/recoupment the-
ory requires several steps: 1) a reexamination of the basic view of what the
firms might have been doing; 2) a better understanding of what constitutes
the costs of predation and how the Japanese firms might have minimized
those costs; 3) an idea of the gains from predation that the Japanese firms
74 See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
75 This is what happened in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072
(1992), where the Court countered the defendant's theory for why it lacked market power by using other
economic theories (information failures and consumer lock-ins) and by noting that the defendant's actual
pricing was inconsistent with its own economic theory and with the theory as proposed by the Department
of Justice. For a deft criticism of the "logic is all" approach taken by the Supreme Court in Matsushita, see
John J. Flynn, An Antitrust Allegory, 38 HAsTINGs L.J. 517 (1987).
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might have sought; and 4) an assessment of the harm that flowed from the
alleged predatory pricing.
2. Rewriting the Story
An alternative explanation for the behavior of the Japanese firms that
could fit the investment/recoupment theory would go like this. As part of a
consistent national approach toward manufacturing (import raw materials,
export value-added finished products), Japanese television manufacturers
saw export markets as economically necessary. The industry also wanted
high prices in the domestic market. Capacity built for export, however,
could serve either market (Japan and the United States use the same televi-
sion signal standard), so the industry needed to be certain that export pro-
duction would not be diverted to domestic markets.
The industry faced several problems in implementing this strategy.
For one, to be successful in the U.S. market and convince U.S. consumers to
desert trusted brand names, the Japanese manufacturers needed to be better
than price competitive with already established major U.S. firms. Selling at
a low price, however, would increase the differential between the price in
the U.S. and the home price, increasing the incentive to divert production to
the home market. For another, it was not so easy to control competition at
home. The oligopoly was not tight and the product market was techno-
logically dynamic. The dynamic aspects of the domestic market were
sharpened by the fact that the set of competitors against whom the Japanese
firms were competing in terms of technology effectively included the U.S.
manufacturers who had developed television in the first place.
The strategies for reducing competition were as follows. The manu-
facturers started by getting control of their distribution networks. Exclusive
outlets, resale price maintenance, and restrictions on sales to discounters
were adopted. This tactic reduced the possibility of intrabrand discounting,
which might put pressure on all pricing, made .entry by potential competi-
tors more difficult, and made manufacturer price collusion easier. The
manufacturers also formed overt cartels to agree on pricing and output.
Both tactics served to keep prices above competitive levels in the domestic
market.
On the export side, the industry began (even before starting the export
drive) by agreeing on minimum prices. In the face of pressure from large
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U.S. mass merchandising buyers, combined with capacity that exceeded
domestic needs, the check prices did not stick. The five-company rule was
then adopted to reduce competitive pressures in the U.S. market and prevent
a pricing free-fall that would hurt everyone. This process was always
tenuous, but the pressure finally ended in 1977 when the U.S. "forced" the
Orderly Marketing Agreement ("OMA") on the Japanese industry, limiting
output and making direct investment a more profitable strategy.
3. The Costs of Predation
The idea that losses from low prices need to be recouped (with inter-
est) through gains by high prices sounds plausible enough, but almost
proves too much. For example, we readily accept the idea that firms will
price below the market price to "get a foothold" in the market. Even though
the firm has no expectation of "recouping" by charging monopoly prices
later, such promotional pricing is not thought of as economically irrational
because the promotional price does not entail forgoing a sale at a higher
price. The seller's next best sale is presumably at an even lower price. In
this sense, the price exceeds its opportunity cost. With price above cost, its
loss (and consequently its "investment" to be recouped) is zero.
Suppose that the promotional price is below cost. Would the seller
sell for such a low price? Again, the question would be opportunity cost.
Unless the seller would be better off simply not making the product (that is,
if the price does not cover its variable costs), it would sell at the below
(average total) cost price. That is, the price received would still be above its
opportunity cost and its loss would be zero. There is still nothing to recoup.
When the Japanese firms were deciding on pricing in the export mar-
ket they would presumably seek the best price they could get, even if it were
below cost. Unless they could get a higher price, they would not be
forgoing any opportunity for more profit and would have no loss to recoup.
This "price equal to opportunity cost" need not bear any relation to manu-
facturing cost. Anything below that opportunity cost, however, would mean
a loss which, in the investment/recoupment scenario, would be an invest-
ment to be recouped.
Viewing the loss in terms of opportunity cost indicates that an actual
measurement of the investment cost of the Japanese firms' export drive is
harder than it might initially appear. One might assume that low promo-
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tional prices, at least in the early years of both monochrome and color sets,
might very well have been above opportunity cost. In those years reliability
would have been a particular issue, given the generally low reputation of
Japanese consumer goods manufacturing and the fact that sales through
mass merchandisers meant that after-market service would be weaker than if
the sales were through the normal distribution channels of the day. This
scenario would mean that even prices below average total cost might not
have entailed the kind of investment loss which would have to be recouped
in subsequent years. On the other hand, sales at low prices in subsequent
years may very well have had a higher opportunity cost, with losses to be
subsequently recouped.
If this view is correct, it would appear that the Supreme Court likely
overestimated the magnitude of the investment the Japanese firms would
have made in "below market price" sales. This error was then compounded
by exaggerating the number of years during which this behavior allegedly
occurred. Put at "two decades" by the Court,76 the outside figure would
actually be fourteen years (1963, when exporting began, to 1977 when the
OMA was agreed to). This assessment would then have to be decreased, at
least on the front end, to account for low opportunity costs compounded by
the early agreement on check prices.
4. Minimizing the Costs of Predation
The Supreme Court suggested that a predatory cartel was unlikely in
part because "each conspirator has a strong incentive to cheat, letting its
partners suffer the losses necessary to destroy the competition while sharing
in any gains if the conspiracy succeeds." 77 This "cheating" is different than
the cheating in a price-raising cartel where firms cheat by taking a lower
price. In a price-lowering conspiracy, firms cheat by not taking a lower
76 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 591 (1986). In this
case the Court was relying on hyperbolic advocacy by Zenith's counsel who sought to tie the defendants'
behavior to their earlier behavior with respect to radios. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 19, at 13.
("Petitioners' conspiracy began in the late 1950s with radios, and then continued successively with black-
and-white television receivers and with color television receivers."). Frank Easterbrook, in a law review
article which the Court quotes, talks about "[f]ifteen years of losses." Id, n.15.
77 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 590 (1986).
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price. This willingness to "let Jack do it" should therefore be fairly
strong.78
This is the reason for the five-company rule. By dividing up custom-
ers the Japanese firms would insure that the costs of predation would be
allocated around the group, rather than being borne disproportionately by a
few. No one would have too many large customers. The rule would also
insure that price competition did not break out among the Japanese firms.
Unrestrained competition offered the possibility of further increasing the
costs of predation, perhaps destroying the cartel.79
5. The Gains From Predation
On the other side of the equation are the gains from predation. The
Supreme Court thought about the gains in terms of monopoly profits. The
alleged predatory cartel was unlikely to be able to destroy the entire U.S.
industry and then engage in monopoly pricing for a sufficiently long time to
recoup the losses (over a period of twenty years) with interest. Added to the
unlikelihood was the fact that subsequent monopoly pricing would have re-
quired a conspiracy, subject to U.S. antitrust enforcement, and was prone to
defeat by new entrants.
Subsequent events have borne out the Court's views on the likelihood
of monopoly in this industry. Monopoly power in the U.S. market has not
come to the Japanese firms which, even today, have market shares below
RCA and Zenith. Given the position of RCA and Zenith when the Japanese
firms embarked on their effort, it does seem doubtful that the Japanese firms
would have ever expected to be able to monopolize the U.S. television
market (of course, they might have expected to, but misjudged).
There are other possible gains, however, that the- Japanese manufac-
turers could have had in mind. The first would be spillover benefits in other
consumer electronic products (although this is somewhat speculative, based
on the state of the current record). The Japanese firms could have believed
that a dominant presence in television production would enable them to
continue to develop related technology, whether in the form of complemen-
tary products, such as VCRs, or in the form of inputs that could be used
78 See Kenneth G. Elzinga, The New International Economics Applied: Japanese Televisions and
US. Consumers, 64 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 941,955-56 (1988).
79 David Schwartzman so argues. See SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 6, at 97.
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elsewhere, such as display screens. The Japanese television manufacturers
have continued to dominate in both of these areas.
A second possible gain is less speculative. The Japanese might well
have believed that profits in the oligopolized U.S. industry were above
competitive rates. Given the necessary scale of entry, and the costs of ac-
quiring technology, this would not be an industry likely to attract so many
competitors as to reduce the industry to a purely competitive situation. That
being the case, the Japanese may have felt that these above-competitive
profits could be redistributed from the U.S firms to them.
The third potential gain, which is the most likely, is a variant of the
familiar idea of rent-seeking. It is well accepted that firms will invest to
gain future monopoly profits (for example, by seeking legislation restricting
entry). This type of rent-seeking is often mentioned as a social cost of mo-
nopoly.80  Similarly, monopoly firms will invest to maintain future
monopoly profits. For example, a monopolist might engage in predatory
pricing to discipline an upstart competitor. The monopolist would presum-
ably spend in predation (invest) up to the amount of the stream of future
monopoly profits it is trying to protect.8'
The Japanese firms were in the position of the hypothetical monopo-
list seeking to protect its future profits, but the profits the Japanese firms
wanted to protect were the supra-competitive profits in the home market.
Their output, if sold in the domestic market, could have undermined the
cartel and produced competitive prices (particularly given the fact that in-
dustry capacity exceeded likely demand in Japan). To protect those profits,
the Japanese firms had an incentive to spend on predation up to an amount
equal to future supra-competitive profits. This means that the Japanese
firms might have rationally priced even below variable costs so long as
those losses were less than the value of the future protected profits in the
domestic market.
If this analysis is correct, the emphasis in the case on profits in the
United States was misplaced. The key was profits in the home market. It is
in this sense that the existence of supra-competitive profits in Japan is rele-
vant. It is not that these profits somehow subsidize losses in the United
80 See RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 11-15 (1976) [hereinafter
POSNER].
81 Note that this type of behavior would be economically rational within the context of the
investment/recoupment theory, even though it would not result in the monopolist being able to charge a
higher price in the end than it was charging before it engaged in its predatory campaign.
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States. It is that the Japanese firms must protect these profits from dissipa-
tion. Why else would the Japanese firms have been selling into the United
States at prices below those which they could have obtained in Japan, at
least in the short run? It is this differential that constitutes the true opportu-
nity cost of the Japanese firms' conduct, and it is this differential which
must be recouped in the form of protected future monopoly rents.8 2
6. The Harm
The investment/recoupment theory also forces a focus on the com-
petitive harm from the alleged predation. Three types of gains to the
Japanese firms are suggested above: 1) spillovers that lead to control of
complementary and input industries; 2) eventual redistribution of supra-
competitive profits from U.S. firms to Japanese firms; and 3) protection of
supra-competitive profits in the home market.
To view these gains as antitrust harms (as we would monopoly pric-
ing) requires a somewhat broader approach to the goals of antitrust than
some might favor. Welfare economics has guided current thinking about
the goals of antitrust, emphasizing allocative efficiency and focusing on the
deadweight loss caused by monopoly pricing. In this view, not even the
redistribution to producers of the consumer surplus is considered antitrust
injury.I In the context of international price predation this approach is ex-
cessively narrow. The indifference as to who gets the consumer surplus is
tolerable (if at all) only in the context of "an economy," that is, a closed
domestic economy. In such an economy, one might argue that it does not
matter who gets the consumer surplus because the resources, whether in the
hands of consumers or producers, will still be available for savings or con-
sumption within that economy. With national economic wealth unaffected,
there is no reason to favor one party over the other.
82 This is not to say that every sale made into the United States incurred a loss in the sense that the
Japanese firms could have sold at a higher price in the domestic market. Assuming that the Japanese firms
had market power in the domestic market, maximization of joint profits in the domestic and foreign
markets would lead the Japanese firms to engage in some amount of output restriction in Japan and some
sales into the United States. This output restriction in the domestic market would actually be greater than if
the Japanese firms were selling only in the domestic market (that is, the joint maximizing price would lead
them to sell less in Japan than they otherwise would). It would only be sales beyond this point that might
bring a higher short-term profit if sold in Japan, but at a long term cost of unraveling the domestic cartel.
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One cannot be as sanguine about the result when the surplus is redis-
tributed out of the economy and national economic wealth is decreased.
Nor can one even be as focused on the deadweight loss and on maximizing
allocative efficiency when the distortions of a second, different economy
enter the picture. Thus, the guide that welfare economics offers for antitrust
policy becomes dimmer when international price predation is at issue.
It might therefore be permissible to widen the concept of harm to go
beyond harm to the consumer and to encompass harm to national economic
welfare. In this setting, the competitive opportunities of U.S. producers
would be as worthy of protection as the interests of U.S. consumers. Wealth
reducing anticompetitive behavior, whether in the form of capturing
spillover benefits or the oligopoly profits of U.S. firms, should not escape
antitrust just because the price to the U.S. consumer is unaffected.
The third type of gain suggested for the Japanese manufacturers was
the protection of supra-competitive prices and profits in the domestic mar-
ket. This is closer to the traditional harm recognized by antitrust, except
that the parties harmed are not citizens of the United States. Nevertheless, it
hardly seems unwarranted for antitrust to show some concern for competi-
tion and its traditional beneficiaries even when those beneficiaries are found
beyond the boundaries of the United States. The issue here is not a
jurisdictional one, nor is it one of standing.8 3 Rather, the issue is simply
identifying why antitrust should be concerned if the Japanese television
firms did engage in a predatory price cartel in the United States.
The focus on the home market is also consistent with extending the
values of free markets into the international economy. Had the markets in
the television industry been operating without competitive restraint, the re-
sults of international trade might have looked quite different. The ability to
restrict output sold in Japan would have decreased, as would the Japanese
firms' willingness to price predatorily in the United States to protect rents in
Japan. Japanese firms would have sold fewer televisions in the United
States and more televisions in Japan. Japanese consumers would have paid
less for their televisions. U.S. producers would have continued as viable
83 There is precedent for allowing foreign citizdns to use U.S. courts to pursue antitrust violations
committed by U.S. firms in foreign markets. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1977)
(foreign government can sue for damages caused by price-fixing conspiracy that operated internationally).
With regard to standing by U.S. firms, if the effort by the Japanese cartel to avoid undermining its profits at
home leads to predatory pricing in the United States, U.S. firms should have standing for having been
directly injured by the behavior.
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competitors, unless the Japanese firms came to the United States with a
properly priced product that consumers preferred on the merits. What could
be wrong with that? And we would have saved money on all that litigation
to boot.
B. Elements of a Cause ofAction for International Predation
The television story offers some suggestions for a cause of action for
international price predation. Such a case would require proof of 1) a
blocked home market in which the sellers were earning above competitive
profits and 2) below cost pricing by the sellers in the target market. Proof
of each of these elements, however, presents some serious problems. There
are also the difficult problems of measuring damages and taking account of
foreign government policies and enforcement.
1. Blocked Home Market
The types of gains suggested above that might flow from interna-
tional predation depend on a blocked home market. If markets are not
blocked, then the cartel should be reluctant to price low in foreign markets
because its behavior is subject to strategic retaliation. With an unblocked
home market, foreign competitors could let the predators take losses in the
foreign market while they divert production to the high-priced domestic
market. In the case of the television cartel, whatever the motives of the
Japanese firms in terms of their pricing strategy in the U.S., they could have
been defeated by Zenith and RCA selling into Japan and taking sales away
from them there.
One could not infer that domestic markets were blocked simply from
observing that there were no foreign sales made in that market. That would
be as consistent with a lack of supra-competitive profits in the home market.
Thus, a cause of action for international price predation would have to
examine more closely the reasons for the lack of foreign firm sales to deter-
mine whether the reasons were consistent both with high profits and
blocked entry.
In some cases it will be possible to prove that the domestic industry
has engaged in concerted behavior to exclude foreign competition. Such
proof may take the form of efforts by the domestic industry to use their eco-
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nomic power to force customers to not buy from foreign firms. In Japan, for
example, this was the pattern in the soda ash industry and has been alleged
to be the case in others (such as flat glass).84
There are other cases in which the mechanism for exclusion is more
complex and perhaps difficult to prove. In the case of Japan, the inability of
foreign firms to sell into Japan has been attributed to a large number of
factors, such as unusual product specifications or certification procedures,
the high cost of creating distribution channels in Japan, a professed belief
among Japanese buyers that foreign suppliers are unreliable, supposed pref-
erences of domestic purchasers for Japanese products, or keiretsu arrange-
ments that make buyers reluctant to alter purchasing patterns and seek
sources of supply outside their keiretsu.
There are two steps that could be taken to disentangle the reasons for
a lack of foreign firm sales. The first would be to require the plaintiff to
show that it had made some efforts to enter the allegedly blocked market.
Such a requirement would serve several functions. It would show that there
were mechanisms operative to exclude foreign firm competition and provide
the opportunity for rents to the predatory cartel. It would place a pro-
competitive burden on foreign firms to defeat predation through competitive
means before they sought the help of the courts. Finally, it would give
assurance to the court that the complaining firms were not weak competitors
seeking protection. In this sense, the requirement of a good faith entry
attempt would serve the same filtering function that the Court saw the in-
vestment/recoupment scenario serving, that is, making certain that the law is
not being used to protect firms from hard competition.8 5
The second step for disentangling the reasons for low foreign sales
would be to allow the plaintiff to carry its initial burden of proof of exclu-
sion through an outlier argument. That is, a plaintiff could argue that exclu-
sion can be inferred by proof of low foreign-firm market shares in relation
to what these foreign firms obtain in other national markets. This inference
would be particularly strong when augmented by proof of the efforts that
84 See Harry First, Japan's Antitrust Policy: Impact on Import Competition, in FRAGILE
INTERDEPENDENCE: ECONOMIC ISSUES IN THE JAPAN-U.S. RELATIONSHIP 63 (Thomas Pugel and Robert
Hawkins eds., 1986). The allegation in the case of flat glass is that the maker of polished wire glass, used
only in Japan, has threatened to withhold supplies if customers buy other types of glass from foreign firms.
85 A weaker version of this requirement would be to allow a plaintiff to satisfy the entry requirement
by showing that other foreign firms had made an entry effort, even though the plaintiff had not done so
(perhaps because it had been dissuaded by the difficulties faced by other entrants).
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the plaintiff made to enter the market. The burden could then shift to the
defendants to explain outlier status by showing legitimate justifications for
low market share.86
2. Below Cost Pricing
Because of the way that the Matsushita litigation developed, there
was little testing of the measure of cost being proposed by Zenith, below
which the Japanese firms were allegedly selling. To some extent, Zenith's
argument appears to have rested on the pricing differential between the do-
mestic and U.S. prices, although there are also allegations that sales were at
a loss. 8
7
A price differential claim is a price discrimination measure, one
which underlies the trade approach to dumping. It is not one which has
found favor among most U.S. courts or commentators. If anything, the cur-
rent view is that price discrimination often serves pro-competitive ends.
Lower prices to one set of consumers reflects competitive demand condi-
tions (why else would a seller lower price?) and can be the way that rigid
price structures start to break down (as the lower prices start to generalize).
The social inequities ("fairness") are not relevant.
As a result of this pro-competitive view of price discrimination,
courts and commentators dealing with predatory pricing have tended to
focus not on differentials, but on the extent to which the predator's price
falls below cost. Where a low-cost seller is outselling the complaining firm,
but is still pricing above cost, there appears to be little reason for con-
demnation. Such behavior captures the essence of efficiency.88
86 It is uncertain how Zenith would have fared under this requirement. Imports into Japan were
certainly low during this period. See Yamamura & Vandenberg, supra note 4, at 253 (imports accounted
for .1% of color televisions as late as 1980). Among the reasons suggested by Zenith were high import
tariffs and restricted distribution channels. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F.
Supp. 1125, 1183-85 (E.D. Pa. 1980); 1992 ITC Study, supra note 65 (tariffs on color televisions were
30% in Japan until 1968, compared to 7.5 to 10% in the U.S. over the same period). The efforts Zenith
made to penetrate this market are unclear. Clyde Prestowitz states that Zenith and Motorola tried "for
years" to obtain distribution in Japan, but without success. CLYDE V. PREsTOWrrz, TRADING PLACES:
How WE ALLOWED JAPAN TO TAKE THE LEAD 202 (1988).
87 On remand from the Supreme Court, Zenith argued that prices had been set "below the competi-
tive market price, but above marginal cost." In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 807
F.2d 44, 47 (3d Cir. 1986).
88 One might argue that with the current emphasis on recoupment, we should pay no attention to
how low the alleged predator is pricing. If the investment in low prices (however small or large the
investment) will be recouped by subsequent above competitive pricing, competitive harm will have been
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If we are to require pricing below cost, the question then becomes
what should be the appropriate level of cost. Areeda and Turner's view that
average variable cost is the appropriate measure has carried great weight,
although courts and enforcement agencies have provided at least theoretical
room for a plaintiff to show predatory pricing where price is between
average variable cost and average total cost.89
Whatever the appropriate test, however, plaintiffs have had difficulty
meeting it. First of all, there are likely to be difficult conceptual issues in
terms of separating costs between variable and fixed. Perhaps more impor-
tant are the practical difficulties of reconstructing the seller's pricing prac-
tices. There may be voluminous sales, over several years, with company
pricing information being kept on an accounting basis rather than as
"average variable costs."
There is an additional problem when encountering a case of interna-
tional price predation. The theoretical base for all the cost-based tests has
been the view that the optimal price is one equal to marginal cost. This is
the price that sets the value of the extra resources expended for producing a
particular product equal to what consumers are willing to pay for that prod-
uct. At this point, resources are being efficiently allocated in a society.
Different economies, however, may have different views of what
constitutes the extra cost (variable cost) for producing a product. For ex-
ample, many large firms in Japan use some form of lifetime employment.
This means that a large component of labor cost is considered fixed rather
than variable. It also means that a larger component of cost may be con-
sidered to be fixed for a Japanese firm than for a firm operating in the
United States. Were a court to insist on the Areeda-Tumer test, which
permits pricing above average variable cost, this would mean that Japanese
firms would be lawfully allowed to price at a lower level than the competing
U.S. firms. From the point of view of efficiency, it would be efficient
within Japan's economy to have the Japanese firms price down to average
variable cost without considering the price of labor, but it would not be ef-
ficient in terms of the U.S. economy because labor costs are variable. But
from the point of view of legal rules that permit markets to work fairly, the
shown. If we are guided by economic rationality, by definition, the benefit to the predator (and harm to the
consumer) in such a case will be larger than the cost to the predator (in the form of low prices).8 9 See, e.g., In re International Tel. & Tel., 104 F.T.C. 280 (1984) (although average variable cost is
the usual line of presumptive illegality, there may be circumstances where prices will be predatory if
between average variable cost and average total cost).
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Japanese firms would be given a lawful competitive advantage over their
U.S. competitors.
These differences indicate that courts should be wary of readily trans-
posing the cost tests developed for domestic economies into the
international context. It is still important to have some reference to below
cost pricing, so as to be certain that we do not discourage competitive pric-
ing by foreign firms selling into the United States. On the other hand, a
strict adherence to an Areeda-Tumer type of test will give foreign firms an
unjustified economic advantage without producing any clear benefits in
terms of optimal resource allocation.
Perhaps the most that can be said at this point is that a court would
have to examine alleged predatory pricing with a less rigid test when the
alleged predator is a foreign firm. Pricing below average total cost should
be a requirement of the plaintiff's proof; we certainly would not want to
prohibit prices by foreign firms which are in excess of their totalcosts, even
if the prices are below the market price or below the costs of their U.S.
competitors. The ultimate question might then be whether the low prices
are "calculated to exclude from the market an equally or more efficient
competitor."90
3. Remedy
International predatory pricing cases could be brought either by the
federal government or by private parties. Government enforcement action
would look toward injunctive relief. Such relief, however, is particularly
problematic in predatory pricing cases where it is often difficult to frame an
injunctive order against low pricing that will make clear to the defendant
what kinds of pricing might violate it.91
Perhaps more useful, and more appropriate, would be a market-
opening injunction. Taking the view that the existence of a closed home
market explains the willingness to sell at predatory prices and insures
against retaliation, a remedy might be to order the foreign defendants to end
their exclusionary efforts in their domestic markets. 92 This should no more
90 POSNER, supra note 80, at 188.
91 See In re Borden, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 1147 (1983) (relief order in predatory pricing case).
92 1 am assuming here that there is no personal jurisdiction problem; if there were, there would be no
underlying predatory pricing litigation in the first place.
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raise issues of extraterritoriality than would the predatory pricing case itself.
This would be an instance of the familiar problem of defendants engaging in
anticompetitive behavior abroad whose effects are felt in-the domestic U.S.
economy.
There is also the private remedy. However important government
antitrust enforcement action has been, it is the private action which has been
the critical component of antitrust enforcement in the United States. One of
the benefits of providing an antitrust cause of action for international
predatory pricing lies precisely in the private enforcement mechanism that
has been an integral part of the Sherman Act since its passage.
The problem here is how to measure damages. Assuming the case
was brought by the competing U.S. firms (as the Matsushita case was), the
measure of damages should focus on the harm caused to their business.
This might involve some effort to put the plaintiffs in the position they
would have been had the predation not occurred. This suggests several
possible measures: 1) the difference in profits earned at the predatory price
and the profits that the plaintiffs would have earned had the predator sold at
a lawful price (that is, at average total cost); 2) the difference between the
profits earned by the plaintiffs at the predatory price and the profits that
would have been earned at the price that would have prevailed had the de-
fendants increased output in the home market to the point where
competitive prices prevailed there; or 3) the difference between the home
market and foreign market price.
The first measure looks only at the predatory price and tries to meas-
ure damages in a violation free market. The second measure takes more
account of the impact of the home market and what would have happened if
prices were equalized across markets. This measure takes closer account of
the theory for liability. It assumes that a foreign firm might sell at a price
below average total cost, but still not violate the antitrust laws if there were
no blockaded home market or if prices were already competitive there; in a
sense, this would also be a lawful price. The third measure is closer to a
traditional dumping measure of damages, but differs from dumping duties
in that the damages are paid to the plaintiff competitors (and trebled), rather
than being paid to the U.S. Treasury.. This measure is not keyed to lost
profits, but assumes that the injury from this type of pricing lies in not sell-
ing at a uniform price in all markets.
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Despite the somewhat poor theoretical fit, it may be that the third
measure is preferable. It is the easiest measure to administer, itself a bene-
fit. This measure would also provide a readily observable pricing line for
foreign firms to use in pricing into the United States. So long as prices are
equalized between markets, there would be no damages. Although we
might prefer that prices be equalized at competitive levels, this approach at
least gives sellers who are concerned that they might be pricing below cost
in export markets some further incentive to eliminate pricing differentials.
4. Accounting for Foreign Government Policies and Enforcement
Antitrust enforcement that deals with conduct occurring abroad al-
ways carries with it the possibility of undue interference in the affairs of a
foreign country. A foreign government might have its own system of anti-
trust enforcement which it would prefer to invoke to deal with the conduct
of firms clearly subject to its jurisdiction. A foreign government might also
decide that open markets and competition are not what it wants for its econ-
omy, and it might adopt measures that are designed to enable its companies
to cooperate to seek advantage abroad.
The television case exhibits both aspects. The Fair Trade
Commission brought a number of antitrust enforcement actions against the
Japanese industry in the 1960s. On the other hand, MfITI had some degree
of involvement in the efforts of the industry to form an export cartel that
enabled the industry to engage in some degree of cooperative behavior with
regard to the U.S. market.
U.S. antitrust law is not without doctrines that can accommodate
these efforts by a foreign government to control and police its economy. If
a foreign antitrust authority were involved in remedying a blocked market,
for example, a U.S. court might be convinced to stay its own proceedings
pending the outcome. This remedy is used in litigation in the United States
where the defendants are engaged in defending parallel private and
government proceedings. On the other hand, if a foreign government was
compelling its firms to engage in predatory pricing in the United States, that
would be recognized as a defense to an antitrust suit in the United States.93
93 See Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 113 U.S. 2891 (1993).
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5. Replacing Trade Law
The antitrust cause of action sketched above cannot be taken as a re-
placement for a trade law approach to international pricing problems. One
reason is that the case explored covers only a small portion of the kinds of
pricing issues that can be the subject of a trade law proceeding complaining
of low prices. Besides escape clause proceedings, which look only at harm
to the domestic industry, trade law permits action in cases where domestic
market and target market prices are the same, that is, where the sellers are
allegedly selling below cost in all markets. This was the case, for example,
in semiconductors. The trade law approach was to construct a fair market
value for semiconductor prices in Japan, which was above the price at
which the Japanese manufacturers were actually selling semiconductors.
The predatory pricing analysis above would not take such an approach. It
would be hard to say that the Japanese semiconductor firms were selling
below cost in the U.S. so as to avoid dissipating monopoly rents in Japan if
they were, in fact, busy dissipating those rents in Japan by dropping their
prices there as well.
There is a second reason why the cause of action cannot replace trade
law. At this time it is quite unclear that the proposed view of recoupment
would be accepted by U.S. courts. The Supreme Court's most recent deci-
sion in this area, Brown & Williamson, focuses on recoupment as "caus[ing]
a rise in price above a competitive level that would be sufficient to
compensate for the amounts expended on the predation. '94 It is unclear
whether the Court would recognize the rent-preservation theory of recoup-
ment, which, if successful, only brings prices back to where they were be-
fore the competitor emerged. It is also unclear whether U.S. courts are
prepared to broaden the view of the goals of antitrust law to encompass the
harms suggested above: a concern with a redistribution of profits that
reduces national economic wealth or with seller behavior that harms foreign
consumers by preserving a foreign cartel (in addition to harming U.S. busi-
94 Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2589 (1993). The
Court in Brown & Williamson also held that a plaintiff alleging predatory pricing must prove that prices
were "below an appropriate measure of cost." Id. at 2587. The Court did not decide, however, whether
average variable cost is the appropriate level. See id. at n. I.
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ness firms).95 In fact, if there is anything clear about the current state of
predatory pricing law in the United States it is that plaintiffs never win.
On the other hand, antitrust law has one particular attraction to liti-
gants that trade law does not possess: injured competitors collect the
damages. A more flexible antitrust cause of action might entice litigants
into the antitrust system. This, in turn, might take some pressure off the
trade law system which seems, inevitably, to move toward quotas and pro-
tectionism, with little ultimate benefit to the very U.S. firms who invoke it.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has used the television cartel case as a way to review
current approaches to international predatory pricing and to suggest how an
antitrust cause of action might be fashioned that would focus attention on
exclusion from the home market.
The first part of the article reviewed the litigation itself, both on the
antitrust and trade sides, and both on the Japanese and U.S. sides. That re-
view showed that there was considerable evidence of cartel agreements in
the industry, agreements which were prosecuted to a very limited extent in
Japan but which, on the export side, were to some extent openly adopted
and approved by MITI. The export drive of the Japanese industry led the
U.S. competitors to seek relief both under trade law and antitrust law.
Legally, the U.S. industry had more success under trade law than un-
der antitrust law. Antidumping margins were found and antidumping penal-
ties set. The antidumping order remains in effect today for many of the
original Japanese firms and antidumping margins continue to be found. On
the antitrust side, after an extensive pretrial discovery and litigation effort,
the Supreme Court held that the U.S. plaintiffs were not even entitled to
take their case to a jury.
95 For example, in Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, in the course of permitting a foreign
government to sue under U.S. antitrust law for damages caused by an international cartel, the Court wrote:
The fact that Congress' foremost concern in passing the antitrust laws was the protection of
Americans does not mean that it intended to deny foreigners a remedy when they are injured by
antitrust violations. Treble-damages suits by foreigners who have been victimized by antitrust
violations clearly may contribute to the protection of American consumers.
Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1977).
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As a practical matter, it is less clear whether the trade route was any
more successful than the antitrust route. It is not clear whether the United
States ever collected any of the dumping duties. An Orderly Marketing
Agreement was imposed, but that only moved the Japanese to import more
expensive television sets and to acquire and build plants in the United
States. In the end, the only U.S.-owned manufacturer is Zenith, and it is
partly owned by a Korean company. The U.S. industry produces no VCRs
and lags in flat screen technology. It is also the case that the market re-
mains roughly at the same level of concentration as it was when the
plaintiffs began their antitrust litigation. The Japanese firms have not mo-
nopolized it.
The second part of the article explored the question of whether the
factual scenario supported the U.S. industry's claim of predatory pricing.
To make a plausible case for the claim of predatory pricing required a closer
understanding both of what the costs of predation might have been for the
Japanese firms and the reasons why these investments might have been eco-
nomically sensible, that is, recoupable.
The costs of predation should properly be seen as the opportunity
costs faced by the Japanese firms. That is, if they could only make sales in
the United States at a low price, they would not have any loss to recoup in
the sense that they had given nothing up by selling at the low price. Viewed
in this way, the amount invested was not necessarily related to the amount
below cost at which the Japanese sold television sets; it was more connected
to their competitive opportunities. In addition, the check price agreement
and the five-company rule appeared to be an effort by the Japanese firms to
reduce the potential costs of predation. Thus, it may be that the Supreme
Court overestimated the amount the Japanese firms might have invested in
predation. Similarly, the Court likely overestimated the time during which
these investments were made.
Three benefits to this scheme were suggested: 1) spillovers in other
consumer electronics industries; 2) eventually obtaining the supra-com-
petitive profits then being earned by the U.S. industry; and 3) protecting the
rents in the Japanese market which would have been dissipated if too much
of the industry's output ended up being sold in Japan. Although each of
these benefits may have occurred, the prevention of rent dissipation seemed
the most plausible given the kinds of cartel agreements that were operating
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in the Japanese market, the extreme price differentials between the two
markets, and the lack of competitive imports into Japan.
This theory for why a predatory pricing campaign could have been
economically rational was then used to generate some requirements for an
antitrust cause of action for international predatory pricing. The recoup-
ment part of that analysis would focus on the blocked home market within
which the alleged predatory cartel was likely earning supra-competitive
profits. A plaintiff would be required to show that the market was blocked.
Such proof could come either from direct evidence of exclusionary practices
or from an inference that could be drawn from outlier status, that is, if im-
ports into the market in a relevant country were below levels in other similar
foreign markets. Outlier status would shift the burden of coming forward to
the defendants to show that the lack of imports was due to some sound
business reason, such as an inferior foreign product. The second require-
ment on this prong of the analysis would be that the firms complaining of
the predation would have to show an effort to enter the foreign market (or,
at least, that other foreign firms had made such an effort and that their fail-
ure had dissuaded the plaintiffs). Such proof would help demonstrate that
the plaintiffs were aggressive competitors with a serious complaint about
competitive disadvantage for which they needed court intervention.
The second requirement for a cause of action would be proof of price
below average total cost. This requirement was left less specific than is cur-
rently acceptable to many U.S. courts following the Areeda-Turner
approach. The need for more vagueness relates directly to the international
aspect of this type of behavior. Trying to guide by variable costs when
firms in different countries treat similar costs (particularly labor) in different
ways creates an improper legal advantage unrelated to efficiency. Further,
constructing rules to maximize the allocation of resources across national
economies is an extremely uncertain effort.
Two remedies were suggested. For a government suit, relief could
include an injunction against exclusionary practices in the foreign market.
For the private suit, the article suggests that damages be assessed as the dif-
ference between domestic and foreign price. Although this is not clearly
related to the profits lost because of the predation, it would be an easier
standard to administer and would give foreign companies clearer guidance
on what type of pricing would avoid a damage award (even if it would- not
necessarily avoid injunctive relief).
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It is not certain whether this type of antitrust remedy would bring
much relief to the pressures on the trading system arising out of a belief that
low prices by foreign firms are "predatory." The state of the law in the
United States regarding predatory pricing is very unfavorable to plaintiffs
and the kinds of cases which would be covered by this cause of action do
not exhaust all cases which are today covered by dumping laws.
It may very well be, however, that there is more room for antitrust en-
forcement in this area than is commonly thought. Based only on the
historical record, it would seem that if there is going to be predatory pricing,
it is more likely to be done by foreign cartels rather than monopolies, and
by cartels trying to avoid spoiling supra-competitive pricing in the home
market.96 Antitrust is an important legal tool that moves the trading system
in the right direction, away from protection and toward the open markets
that give consumers the opportunity to choose the best products on their
merits and give producers the opportunity to compete free from the strategic
uses of market power.
96 For examples, see VINER, supra note 3, at 36 (quoting Adam Smith), 51-66 (export bounties paid
to German producers by German cartels as incentive to sell output abroad). Interestingly, Viner found
systematic dumping to be less prevalent by U.S. companies because of legal prohibitions on cartel
formation; he found only one example of systematic grants of export bounties. Id at 84-85.
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